Kurz in Econometrica 51(4):1047–1064, 1983) for situations in which players have ambiguous expectations about the formation of the coalitions in which they are not
involved; then we analyzed the corresponding evolutionary games. In this paper, we embody into the model rationality of the
players; it follows that allowing for mixed strategies makes it impossible to construct unequivocally a von Neumann–Morgestein
expected utility function coherent (in the sense of de Finetti B in Sul Significato Soggettivo della Probabilità, Fundamenta Mathematicae, T, vol XVIII, pp
298–329, 1931) to every strategy profile. We find out that if the multiplicity of coherent beliefs problem is approached by considering
“ambiguity loving” players then existence results for classical static equilibria can be obtained in this model. Moreover,
we provide conditions for the game to be dynamically playable and we find how the coalition structure beliefs might evolve
coherently (according) to the evolution of the strategies.
- Content Type Journal Article
- DOI 10.1007/s00500-010-0573-3
- Authors
- Giuseppe De Marco, Università di Napoli Parthenope Dipartimento di Statistica e Matematica per la Ricerca Economica Via Medina 40 80133 Naples Italy
- Maria Romaniello, Seconda Università di Napoli Dipartimento di Strategie Aziendali e Metodologie Quantitative Corso Gran Priorato di Malta 81043 Capua Italy
- Journal Soft Computing – A Fusion of Foundations, Methodologies and Applications
- Online ISSN 1433-7479
- Print ISSN 1432-7643